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Running a financially healthy and balanced national sports league is among the central prerequisites 
for attracting the right to host an international mega-event like the FIFA
1 World Cup or the UEFA
2 
European Football Championship. A successful league guarantees that the required infrastructure (e.g., 
stadiums, etc.) is provided. Moreover, a strong and balanced national sports league that fosters the strength 
of the national team is crucial for staging a successful mega-event because the economic outcome of the 
mega-event is heavily influenced by the sporting success of the home team. For example, Domen et al. 
(2006) show that the outcome of the 2006 World Cup strongly affected individuals’ perceptions about 
economic prospects. If the German team had reached the final at the 2006 World Cup, Raetzel and Weiman 
(2006) estimate that the accumulated positive welfare effects would have been 747 million Euros. Heyne et 
al. (2007) show significant ex-post increase in valuation of the 2006 World Cup, which they attribute to the 
World Cup being an experience good. On the one hand, this finding maybe due to the unusually beneficial 
weather conditions, but on the other hand, it also reflects the (unexpected) success of the German team.
3  
 
Therefore, the successful hosting of a mega-event hinges on a solid foundation of a financially 
healthy and balanced domestic league. In the last two decades, however, increasing financial disparities and 
spiralling wages have become well-known problems in the European football leagues. Many European 
football clubs face serious financial problems. Some even went bankrupt. Restrictions on foreign players 
can help to alleviate these problems because foreign player restrictions may promote competitive balance 
while strengthening the financial situation of small clubs. 
 
In December 1995, the European Court of Justice issued the famous Bosman verdict abolishing not 
only the existing transfer system but also the so-called "3+2 Rule," which restricted the number of foreign 
players a club may field. Since then, the proportion of foreign players has significantly increased in 
European professional football. For example, the percentage of foreign players in the English Premier 
League rose from 31 percent in the 1995-96 season up to 56.3 percent in the 2002-03 season. A similar trend 
can be observed in all Big Five Leagues. In the French Ligue 1, the percentage of foreign players rose from 
13.6 to 24.3 percent; in the Spanish Primera Division, it rose from 19.6 to 38.6 percent; in the Italian Serie A, 
the increase was from 15.4 to 33.6 percent; and in the German Bundesliga, the jump was from 25.2 to 53.6 
percent. 
 
By considering the proportion of foreign players in the squads of some currently dominant European 
clubs, the picture is even more drastic. For example, 91.7 percent of those who play for Arsenal F.C. are 
foreign. Additionally, 85.2 percent of the Internazionale Milano FC, 85.2 percent of the Liverpool F.C., 74.1 
percent of the Chelsea F.C., and 62.5 percent of the Real Madrid squads are foreign players.
4 After the 
Bosmon ruling, similar trends are observable in other types of sports in Europe as well. From the 1994-95 
season to the 2001-02 season, the proportion of foreign players in basketball increased from 17.1 to 39 
percent; it increased from 12.1 to 40.1 percent in handball, and from 10.2 to 59 percent in ice hockey. These 
figures from professional sports are in stark contrast to the general proportion of the foreign work force in 
the European Union. On average, only 6.3 percent workers in the EU-25 are from foreign countries.
5 
 
The UEFA argues that these changes in the proportion of foreign players who play in the European 
football leagues could have severe, detrimental effects on the "competitive balance in the national leagues, 
the training and development of young players and the quality of, and competition between national teams." 
After the abolition of the foreigner restriction, affluent clubs could take advantage of the freely available 
foreign players to increase their own strength, which, in turn, could create a distortion in sporting 
                                                 
1 Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
2 Union des Associations Européennes de Football 
3 In general, the macroeconomic effects of hosting a mega-event are estimated to be rather small or negligible and the 
measured positive effects are concentrated on some specific sectors like beer brewing and tourism (e.g., Szymanski 
2002). The intangible welfare effects, on the other hand, are considered to be the dominant positive effects (e.g., Heyne 
and Suessmuth, 2007). 
4See CIES (2008). 
5See INEA (2008). competition by impeding the smaller clubs from entering the top group. Moreover, the incentives to invest 
in the development of young, regional talent decrease because clubs can recruit fully trained players, often 
for less money, from other countries. 
 
The UEFA reacted to this development and proposed the so-called "homegrown rule" to its 52 
national member associations during its congress held in Tallin on April 21, 2005. Football clubs taking part 
in UEFA club competitions, like the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Cup Matches, had to include 
six locally trained players in their 25-player squad for the 2007-08 season. According to UEFA regulations, 
a "locally trained" player is either a club-trained player or an association-trained player. A “club-trained” 
player is a player who, regardless of his nationality or age, has been registered with his current club for a 
period of three entire seasons between the age of 15 and 21.  The requirements for an “association-trained” 
player are the same except that the player only must have been registered with any club affiliated with the 
same national association of his current club. The rule requires that, of the six "locally trained" players, at 
least three of them must be "club-trained". This requirement was increased by two players in the subsequent 
season so that by the start of the 2008-09 season, the minimum number of "locally trained players" required 
per club was eight with at least four "club-trained" players. 
 
Although the ruling does not apply yet to domestic competitions, UEFA is encouraging its members 
to impose identical quotas in their own national competitions too. According to UEFA, the "training and 
development of young players is of crucial importance to the future of football. Every football club in every 
national football association should play a part in this process". In 2008, based on an independent study,
6 the 
European Commission formally endorsed UEFA's "homegrown rule", subject to a review of their practical 
consequences by 2012. According to the Commission, the proposed rule sets a quota of locally trained 
players at clubs, but it does not discriminate based on nationality; thus, the rule complies with the principle 
of free movement of workers while promoting the training of young European players. 
 
Before proceeding to the model, we present a short overview of the relevant literature. Simmons 
(1997) shows that the average contract length of professional football players has significantly increased 
since the Bosman ruling. Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) analyze the economic effect of the Bosman ruling. 
Based on empirical evidence and the theory of real options, they support Simmons’ result. Moreover, they 
argue that the Bosman ruling had little effect on player salaries, investment into human capital, or transfer 
activity. They attribute the rise in salaries to increasing television revenues. Feess and Muehlheusser (2003) 
compare the Pre-Bosman regime, the Bosman regime, and the Monti regime with respect to contract length, 
training, and effort incentives. They argue that the prohibition of transfer restrictions reallocates bargaining 
power from a player's current club to potential new clubs. This reallocation of bargaining power reduces the 
current club's incentive to invest in the player's human capital, because the current club has to bear the 
investment costs without being able to appropriate all the investment benefits if the player transfers to a new 
club. Their paper shows that the different regimes only differ with respect to the contract length. Based on a 
bargaining model with stochastic player productivity, Dietl et al. (2008) show that football players may 
benefit from more restrictive transfer rules. The right to charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their 
players, and the players, in turn, benefit by converting risky future income into riskless current income. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze the general implications of a restriction 
in foreign talent on clubs' investment behaviour. We provide a theoretical model based on contest theory and 
analyze the effect of such a foreigner rule on the investment behaviour of profit-maximizing clubs in a 
professional team sports league. More precisely, we investigate the impact on competitive balance, the wage 
level of the players, and club profits. Our model shows that a league with a binding restriction on foreign 
talent for all clubs (Regime B) is characterized through a higher degree of competitive balance than a league 
without a binding restriction on foreign talent (Regime A). Moreover, the wage level of domestic (foreign) 
talent is higher (lower) in Regime B than in Regime A. Finally, a more restrictive foreigner rule increases 
profits of all clubs. 
 
                                                 
6See Ineum Consulting (2008). 
 
 2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The following contest model describes the investment behaviour of profit-maximizing clubs in a 
professional team sports league. We consider a two-club league where each club invests 
independently in playing talent in order to maximize its own profits.
1, 2 i =
7 
Our league features the possibility to invest in both domestic talent and foreign talent, whereby  i x   
and i represent the units of domestic and foreign talent, respectively. Both domestic and foreign talent is 
measured in perfectly divisible units that can be hired in a competitive labour market. We assume that 
domestic talent
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The wage levels per unit of domestic and foreign players are denoted by  and  , respectively. 
Thus, aggregate investment costs for domestic and foreign talent are given for club i by 
.
0 x c > 0 y c >
(,) iii x i y i cxy c x c y =+
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We introduce a foreigner rule in our model which limits the number of foreign players each club can 
have. We therefore assume that the amount of foreign talent that club i can hire is limited by a 
constant 0 θ > . 
 
The contest success function (CSF) maps the vector of talent investment into the winning 
probabilities i for each club. We apply the logit approach, which is the most widely used functional form of 
a CSF in sporting contests,
w
9 yielding the following win percentage of club i 
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where x and  are vectors of all clubs' domestic and foreign talent, respectively; i.e.,  y ( , ) ij x xx =  and 
.  (, i ) j yy y =
 
We further assume that the supply of talent for both domestic talent and foreign talent is flexible. 
Thus, the number of talent hired by club i has no influence on the talent pool that is available to the other 
club j. In this case, a club can sign additional (domestic and foreign) talent without decreasing the number of 










∂ = . A 
non-fixed pool of talent can easily be justified in the European football leagues. Especially after the Bosman 
verdict in 1995 which established an international players market.
10 
 
The revenue function of club i is given by  ( ( , ), ) ii i R wxymand is assumed to have the following 
                                                 
7For an analysis about the impact of the clubs' objective function, see e.g., Fort and Quirk (2004), Vrooman (2000, 
2008) and Dietl et al. (2009). 
8For the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account other than labour costs and normalize the fixed capital cost to 
zero. See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost function where clubs have different marginal costs or Késenne 
(2007) for a cost function with a fixed capital cost. 
9The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and later was axiomatised by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark 
and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) or 
the difference-form CSF (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1989). 
10The conventional approach to model the closed U.S. player market is to assume a fixed talent supply, together with 
Walrasian conjectures. This, however, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium as emphasized by Szymanski (2003b). properties:
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≤  everywhere. The parameter   represents the market size of 
club i. Without loss of generality, we assume that club 1 is the "large-market" club and club 2 is the 
"small-market" club. The large club generates higher revenues for a given win percentage than the small 
club. Since we consider a two-club league, we can normalize the market size of the small club to unity and 
write m instead of   such that  . 
0 i m >




The profit function of club i, denotedπ , is given by revenues minus costs 
 
() (( ) ( ii ii i i wR w mc , ) , x y ,) . ii x y π =−  (2) 
 
Club   chooses an investment level of playing talent such that its own profits  i 1,2 i = π  are maximized 
subject to a constraint for the foreign talent. The constraint represents the foreigner rule, which implies that 
the number of foreign players in club i must not exceed a given threshold value θ . Hence, club i has to solve 
the following maximization problem  
 
0, 0 max ( ( , ) s.t.
ii
ii i xy wxy , ) m i y π θ ≤




To make further progress and to derive closed form solutions, we choose specific functional forms for 
the h function and the revenue function. First, we assume that domestic and foreign talent are combined in 
each club via a Cobb-Douglas function; i.e.,  ii hx ( , ) iii y x
α y
β =  where 0 α > and 0 β >
( , i
are parameters 
determining the relative strength of domestic and foreign talent, respectively. Second, we assume that the 
revenue function of club i is linear in its own win percentage with  (( , ) ii ,) i ) i R wxym wxy m = .
12 
 


























































































for     and  ij . , 1,2 ij = i λ  are Lagrange multipliers. 
 
To characterize the equilibrium, we have to distinguish different regimes depending on whether the 
foreigner rule is binding or not.
13 
                                                 
11 See Szymanski and Késenne (2004). 
12This concave revenue function has the desired properties and is consistent with the revenue function in, e.g., Hoehn 
and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003a), Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Vrooman (2007) and Dietl and Lang 
(2008). Our results, however, are also robust with respect to a quadratic revenue function. 
13See also Dietl et al. (2009). 
  
3.1. Regime A: The foreign player rule is ineffective for both clubs 
 
 In this section, we consider the benchmark case in which the foreigner rule is ineffective for both 
clubs; i.e., the constraint for foreign talent is not binding. 
 
In Regime A, the equilibrium demand of club  1,2 i =  for domestic and foreign talent is computed 


























with   and  .   1 2
We derive that, without a binding restriction on foreign talent, the large-market club demands a 
higher amount of both domestic and foreign talent in equilibrium; i.e.,  12
mm = 1 m =
A x x >  and  12  since  . 
This is due to the fact that the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for the large club. Moreover, 
the talent investment in domestic (foreign) talent is increasing in its effectiveness parameters 
A yy >
A 1 m >
α  and β . 
 
Thus, we are in Regime A if, in equilibrium, the constraint θ  for foreign talent does not bind for the 
large-market club; i.e., if  , where  1 (,)
A I θθ ∈= ∞ 11
A y θ = . 
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The equilibrium wage level of the players is determined in the labour market. We assume that the 
supply of domestic and foreign talent is given by  x x s c  and  yy s c , respectively, with  . By equating 
supply and demand and solving for the players' equilibrium wage level 
, 0 xy ss>
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Plugging the equilibrium demand (5) into the CSF (1), we derive the following equilibrium win 
















                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
It is clear that the large club is the dominant team, which has a higher win percentage in equilibrium than the 
small club, i.e.,  .  12
AA ww >
 
The difference in win percentage measures the degree of competitive balance CB in the league which 



















Note that a more balanced league is characterized by a lower value of CB. Thus, a fully balanced 
league yields  .  0 CB =
 
We conclude that, in Regime A, the clubs' profits given by   do not depend on the wage level 




y s  and  x s . This result is due to the Cobb-Douglas formulation in the CSF: 
every percentage change in the players' wage level leads to an equal percentage change in the number of 
talent hired, and thus the total amount spent on talent remains constant. 
 
3.2. Regime B: The foreigner rule is effective for both clubs 
 
In Regime B, we assume that the foreigner rule is effective for both clubs. In other words, the 
constraint on foreign talent θ  is binding for both clubs. This is true if  2 (0, ]
B I θ θ ∈=  . The definite size of  
2 θ  depends on how the small club reacts to the introduction of the foreigner restriction in Regime C. 
 
In Regime B, the equilibrium demand of club  1,2 i =  for domestic and foreign talent is computed 




















with   and   . Again, the large club demands more domestic talent than the small club; i.e.,   1 mm = 2 1 m =
12
B B x x >   since   .  1 > m
 









































By plugging the equilibrium demand for domestic and foreign talent into (1), we derive the 


































A more restrictive foreigner rule, i.e., a lower value of θ , increases the profits of both clubs, whereas it 
decreases the wage level for foreign players. 
 
Proof: Straightforward and therefore omitted. 
 
The intuition for this result is that a tighter restriction on foreign talent reduces the negative 
externality the clubs impose on each other when hiring another unit of talent. Due to the contest structure, 
both teams can lower their investment in domestic or foreign talent by k percent without changing the win 
percentages. This lowers costs, while leaving the revenues unchanged. 
 
We see that the equilibrium demand for domestic talent 
B
i x  of club i is independent of the restriction 
θ  on the amount of foreign talent. As a consequence, the equilibrium wage level 
B
x c  for domestic talent is 
also unaffected by changes in θ . Moreover, both clubs adapt their equilibrium demand 
B
i y  for foreign 
talent due to variations of θ   in the same way; i.e., 
12
B B y y
θ θ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ = . It follows that the equilibrium win 
percentages ( 12 , )
B B ww  of both clubs and the competitive balance 
B CB  in Regime B remain unchanged 
across variations in θ . Furthermore, the revenues of both clubs are also unaffected. In contrast, the 
equilibrium demand 
B
i y  for foreign talent decreases with a lower value of θ , which implies a lower wage 
level for foreign players in equilibrium. It directly follows that profits of both clubs increase since revenues 
stay equal and costs decrease. 
 
3.3. Comparison of Regimes A and B 
 
In this section, we derive more insights regarding the effect of a foreigner rule by comparing Regimes 
A and B. That is, we compare a league without a (binding) restriction on foreign talent with a league that has 




(i) The equilibrium demand and wage level of domestic (foreign) talent is higher (lower) in Regime B than in 
Regime A . 
(ii) The introduction of a foreigner rule, i.e., a binding restriction on the amount of foreign talent, increases 
competitive balance. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The first part of the proposition shows that the introduction of a foreigner rule decreases the wage 
level of foreign players. Intuitively, this is clear since the aggregate demand for foreign players decreases in 
the transition from Regime A to Regime B; i.e.,  . Thus, the market clearing price   for foreign 
talent must decrease accordingly. In contrast, each club will demand more domestic talent in a league with a 
binding restriction on foreign talent. In other words, aggregate demand for domestic talent is higher in 





A x x < . It also follows that the wage level for domestic talent will 
increase in the transition from Regime A to Regime B. 
 
The second part of the proposition states that the introduction of the foreigner restriction increases 
competitive balance. This is because the large club is more severely handicapped by the restriction on foreign talent than the small club.
14 Hence, the win percentage of the large club will decrease, and the win 
percentage for a small club will increase, in the transition from Regime A to Regime B. As a consequence, a 
binding foreigner rule is beneficial for the competitive balance in the league. Moreover, the large club's 
revenue decreases and the small club's revenue increases. The effect on clubs' profits, however, is 
ambiguous and depends on the parameter constellation. 
 
 
3.4. Regime C: The foreigner rule is only effective for the large-market club 
 
In Regime C, we assume that the foreigner rule is only effective for the large-market club; i.e., the 
restriction on foreign talent is only binding for club 1. Thus, we are in Regime C if  21 (,]
C I θ θθ ∈= .
15  
 
The equilibrium demand of club  1,2 i =   for domestic and foreign talent is computed from the 
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Again, the large club has a higher demand for both domestic and foreign talent in equilibrium. 
































By plugging the equilibrium demand for domestic and foreign talent into (1), we derive the win 
percentage in Regime C as  
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yy w w cm cm
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Since the large club demands more of both domestic and foreign talent, we derive that this club also 
has a higher win percentage in equilibrium. Competitive balance in Regime C is then given by  
 
 
                                                 
14Remember that the large club demands a higher amount of foreign talent in Regime A; i.e.,  .  12
AA yy >
15We present this regime for the sake of completeness. Regime C, however, is not likely to be effective since, e.g., the 
UEFA plans to implement a foreigner rule which is binding for both small and large clubs. 
16Note that we have to restrict our analysis in Regime C to the special case where  1 β =  and talent supply is completely 
elastic. Otherwise, the first-order conditions (4) can not be solved analytically. Moreover, we assume that 1 y mc
αθ > . 
In the next section we provide a numerical example in order to show that the results we derive for this special case also 
carry over to the general case. 
 12 21
CCC
y CB w w c m
αθ =−= − > 0 .  
 




In Regime C, a more restrictive foreigner rule, i.e., a lower value of  θ  , increases the demand for domestic 
talent for both clubs and increases (decreases) the demand for foreign talent for the small (large) club. 
Moreover, the corresponding effect on competitive balance is positive. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The proposition shows that a tighter restriction on foreign talent, which is only binding for the large 
club, induces both clubs to substitute some of the lost talent with domestic talent. Moreover, the small club 
will also increase its demand for foreign talent.
17 It follows that, as the regulation becomes more restrictive, 
i.e., as θ   decreases, the league becomes more balanced. As a consequence, the small club's revenue 
increases, and the large club’s revenue decreases. Given constant player wages, total costs decrease for the 
small club and thus its profit increases. The large club will save on foreign players but faces decreasing 
revenue and increasing expenditure for domestic players, which makes the total effect on the large club's 
profit undetermined. 
 
3.5. Numerical Simulation 
 
To illustrate the effect of restriction on foreign talent, we provide a numerical simulation that 
summarizes our main results. Remember that Regime A is effective if  11 (,)( ,)
A y θθ ∈ ∞= ∞, whereas 
Regime B is active for  2 (0, ] θ θ ∈ , and Regime C for  21 (,] θ θθ ∈ . Also recall that a lower value of the 
parameter θ  characterizes a tighter restriction on foreign players. 
 
The upper part of Figure 1 depicts competitive balance  12 CB w w = −  as a function of the parameter  
θ  and shows that competitive balance increases in the transition from Regime A to Regime B.
18 
 
The lower part of Figure 1 depicts the aggregate demand for domestic talent  12 x x +  and foreign 
talent  12  as functions of the parameter  yy + θ . It illustrates that, in the transition from Regime A to Regime 
B, the aggregate demand for domestic talent increases while the aggregate demand for foreign talent 
decreases. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the profits  1 π  of the large club and the profits  2 π  of the small club as functions of 
the parameter θ . The figure shows that profits of the small club increase in the transition from Regime A to 
Regime B. The profits of the large club, however, decrease in Regime C and then increase again in Regime 
B. In addition, the figure shows that it is undetermined whether the profits of the large club are higher in 
Regime A or in Regime B. 
 
                                                 
2
17This implies that    .  21
A y θ >
18Note that a lower value of     indicates a more balanced league.  1 ww − Figure 1. Effect of foreigner restriction on talent investment and competitive balance 























































































A profitable and balanced domestic sports league that fosters domestic talent not only increases the 
probability of a successful application for a mega-event, it also crucially increases the prospects of a 
successful event because multiplier effects can be triggered more easily if the interest of the hosting nation is 
sustained by a progressing national team. 
 
Increasing dominance by some rich clubs, spiralling wages, and financial instability are the major 
challenges in European football. In this paper, we have shown that a restriction on foreign players can help 
to alleviate these problems. Foreign player restrictions promote competitive balance while strengthening the 
financial situation of small clubs and fostering the development of domestic talent. 
 
Recently, FIFA also proposed a limit on the number of foreign football players. FIFA aims to 
implement the so-called "6+5 rule", which means that each team must field in the starting "eleven" at least 
six players eligible for the national team of the club’s country. However, there would be no restrictions on 
the number of foreign substitute players and no limit on the total number of foreigners a club can sign. The 
proposed 6+5 rule has the backing of 155 of FIFA's 208 member nations, but it has been dismissed as illegal 
by the European Commission because it discriminates on the basis of nationality and is a restriction on the 
free movement of workers.   
Figure 2: Effect of foreigner restriction on club profits 






























Regime A Regime C Regime B
For the numerical exercise, the following parameter values where used: sx=1, sy=1.2, m=2, α= 0.5, β = 0.5. 
 
 
However, a recent report by the "Institute for European Affairs" (INEA) claims that "the 6+5 rule is in 
accordance with Art. 151 EC and the new Art. 165 TFU of the Lisbon Treaty, because it reflects the 
autonomy of sport compared to the purely economic orientations of the fundamental freedoms and the 
competitive order." Moreover, "the key aim of the 6+5 rule in the view of the experts is the creation and 
assurance of sporting competition. The 6+5 rule does not impinge on the core area of the right to freedom of 
movement. The rule is merely a rule of the game declared in the general interest of sport in order to improve 
the sporting balance between clubs and associations."
19 
 
In the light of our analysis, a system like FIFA's "6+5 rule" also seems to be an appropriate means to 
alleviate the current problems in most European football leagues. Even though it was deemed to be illegal 
by the European Court of Justice, the EU should reconsider its decision, acknowledging the peculiarity of 
the sports industry. 
 
 
                                                 




Proof of Proposition 2 
 
First, we show that the equilibrium demand and wage level of domestic (foreign) talent is higher 
(lower) in Regime B than in Regime A. We derive that the aggregate demand for domestic talent in Regime 
A and B after inserting the equilibrium wage is given by 
 
( ) ( )
1/2 1/2
(1 ) (1 )
  and   .
11













It can easily be verified that 
AB x x < ; i.e., aggregate demand for domestic talent is higher in Regime 
B than in Regime A. Moreover, due to the foreigner restriction it is clear that aggregate demand for foreign 




Second, we show that the introduction of a foreigner rule, i.e., a binding restriction on the amount of 




AB CB CB m
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which is fulfilled for all  . This proves the second part of the proposition.  1 m >
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
First, we show that a more restrictive foreigner rule, i.e., a lower value of θ , increases the demand for 
domestic talent for both clubs in Regime C. We compute the derivative of 
C
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∂ <  since 
1
1 2
C w > . That is, both clubs increase their demand for 
domestic talent through a lower value of θ , which proves the claim. 
 
Second, we show that a more restrictive foreigner rule increases (decreases) the demand for foreign 
talent for the small (large) club in Regime C. The derivative of    with respect to 
C



















which proves the claim. 
 
Finally, we show that a more restrictive foreigner rule increases competitive balance in Regime C. 
We compute the derivative of     with respect to 












It follows that competitive balance increases and the league becomes more balanced through a more 
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